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Summary  findings
The setting for this good-natured  training guide for  Ms. Speedy Analyst's on-the-job training in how to
impact evaluation is the fictional developing country  assess the impact of a social program provides the vehicle
Labas. Twelve months ago the government introduced an  through which this paper explains:
antipoverty program in Northwest Labas with support  *  Methods of evaluating a program's impact-
from the World Bank. The program aims to provide cash  randomizing, matching, reflexive comparisons, double
transfers to poor families with school-age children. To be  difference (or "difference in difference") methods, and
eligible to receive the transfer, households must have  instrumental variables methods.
observable characteristics that suggest they are poor. To  *  The types of data used for impact evaluation, typical
continue receiving the transfer, they must keep their  problems with and uses of data, control variables,
children in school until 18 years of age. The program is  instrumental variables, regressions, and so on.
called PROSCOL.  *  How to form and match comparison groups.
The government wants to assess PROSCOL's impact  *  Sources of bias.
on poverty, to help decide whether the program should  *  The value of baseline surveys.
be expanded or dropped.  The Finance Minister asks the  *  Measures of poverty (headcount index, poverty gap
undersecretary, and the undersecretary calls in Ms.  index, and squared poverty gap).
Speedy Analyst.  *  How to compare poverty with and without the
program.
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This paper  aims  to provide  an introduction  to the concepts  and methods  of impact  evaluation.  The
paper  assumes  that readers  are familiar  with basic  statistics  up to regression  analysis  (as would  be covered
in an introductory  text on econometrics).  For their comments  and discussions  I am grateful  to Judy  Baker,
Kene Ezemenari,  Emanuela  Galasso,  Paul Glewwe,  Jyotsna  Jalan,  Emmanuel  Jimenez,  Aart Kraay,
Robert  Moffitt,  Rinku  Murgai,  Pedro  Olinto,  Berk Ozler,  Laura  Rawlings,  Dominique  van de Walle,  and
Michael  Woolcock.The setting for our story is the developing  country,  Labas. 12 months ago, its Government
introduced  an anti-poverty  program in Northwest  Labas, with support  from the World Bank. The
program aims to provide cash transfers to poor families with school-age  children.  To be eligible to
receive the transfer, households must have certain observable  characteristics  that suggest they are
"4poor";  to continue receiving the transfer  they must keep their kids in school until 18 years of age.
The program is called PROSCOL.
The Bank's Country Director for Labas has just asked the Government  to assess PROSCOL's
impact on poverty,  to help determnine  whether  the program should  be expanded  to include the rest of
the country,  or be dropped. The Ministry  of Social Development  (MSD)  runs PROSCOL. However,
the Bank asked if the Finance Ministry could  do the evaluation,  to help assure independence,  and to
help develop capacity for this type of evaluation in a central unit of the government  - close to where
the budgetary  allocations are being made. The Government  agreed to the Bank's request. The
Minister of Finance  has delegated  the task to Mr. Undersecretary,  who has called in one of his
brightest staff, Ms Speedy Analyst.
Four years ago, Speedy Analyst graduated  from the Labas  National University,  where she did
a Masters in Applied  Economics. She has worked in the Finance Ministry since then. Speedy has a
reputation  for combining good common sense  with an ability to get the most out of imperfect data.
Speedy also knows that she is a bit rusty on the stuff she learnt at LNU.
Mr. Undersecretary gets straight  to the point. "Speedy, the Government  is spending a lot of
money on this PROSCOL program,  and the Minister wants to know whether  the poor are benefiting
from it, and how much. Could you please make an assessment."
Speedy thinks this sounds a bit too vague for her liking; what does he mean by "benefiting",
she thinks to herself. Greater clarity on the program's objectives would  be helpful.
"I will try to do my best, Mr. Undersecretary. What, may I ask, are the objectives of
PROSCOL,  that we should judge it against?"
2Mr. Undersecretary  does not seem entirely  comfortable  with such a direct question. He
answers: "To reduce poverty in Labas,  both now and in the future."
Speedy  tries to pin this down further.  "I see. The cash transfers  aim to reduce current poverty,
while by insisting  that transfer recipients  keep their kids in school, the program  aims to reduce future
poverty".
"Yes, that's right, Speedy".
"So I guess we need to know  two things about the program. Firstly,  are the cash transfers
mainly going to low-income families? Secondly,  how much is the program increasing school
enrollment  rates?"
"That should do it, Speedy. Here is the file on the program that we got from the Ministry of
Social Development."
Thus began Speedy Analyst's on-the-job  training in how to assess the impact of a social
program. Note 1 summarizes the methods  she will learn about over the following  days.
The mystery unfolds
Back in her office, Speedy finds that the file from MSD includes  some useful descriptive
material on PROSCOL.  She learns  that targeting is done on the basis of various "poverty proxies",
including  the number of people in the household,  the education  of the head,  and various attributes  of
the dwelling. PROSCOL pays a fixed amount  per school-age  child to all selected  households on the
condition  that the kids attend 85% of their school classes, which has to be verified  by a note from the
school.
3Note 1: Methods  for evaluating  program  impact
The essential problem of impact evaluation is that we do not observe the outcomes for participants if
they had not participated. So evaluation is essentially a problem of missing data. A "comparison group"
is used to identify the counter-factual of what would have happened without the program. The
comparison group is designed to be representative of the "treatment group" of participants with one key
difference: the comparison group did not participate. The main methods available are as follows:
*  Randomization, in which the selection into the treatment and comparison groups is random in some
well-defined set of people. Then there will be no difference (in expectation) between the two
groups besides the fact that the treatment group got the program. (There can still be differences due
to sampling error; the larger the size of the treatment and comparison samples the less the error.)
*  Matching. Here one tries to pick an ideal comparison group from a larger survey. The comparison
group is matched to the treatment group on the basis of a set of observed characteristics, or using
the "propensity score" (predicted probability of participation given observed characteristics); the
closer the propensity score, the better the match. A good comparison group comes from the same
economic environment and was administered the same questionnaire by similarly trained
interviewers as the treatment group.
*  Reflexive comparisons, in which a "baseline" survey of participants is done before the intervention,
and a follow-up survey done after. The baseline provides the comparison group, and impact is
measured by the change in outcome indicators before and after the intervention.
*  Double difference (or "difference in difference") methods. Here one compares a treatment and
comparison group (first difference), before and after a program (second difference). Comparators
should be dropped if they have propensity scores outside the range observed for the treatment
group.
*  Instrumental variables methods.  Instrumental variables are variables that matter to participation,
but not to outcomes given participation. If such variables exist then they identify a source of
exogenous variation in outcomes attributable to the program - recognizing that its placement is not
random but purposive. The instrumental variables are first used to predict program participation,
then one sees how the outcome indicator varies with the predicted values.
No method is perfect. Randomization is fraught with problems in practice. Political feasibility is often a
problem. And even when selection is randomized, there can still be selective non-participation.
Matching methods only deal with observable differences; there will still be a problem of latent
heterogeneity, leading to a possible bias in estimating program impact. Selective attrition plagues both
randomization and double-difference estimates. It is always desirable to triangulate methods.
The file includes a report, "PROSCOL:  Participants'  Perspectives",  commissioned by MSD
and done by a local consultant. The report was based on qualitative interviews with program
administrators  and focus groups of participants. Speedy cannot tell whether those interviewed were
representative  of PROSCOL participants, or how poor they are relative to those who were not picked
for the program and were not interviewed.  The report says that the kids went to school, but Speedy
wonders whether they might not have also gone to school if the program had not existed.
4Speedy reflects to herself. "This  report is a start, but it does not tell me how poor PROSCOL
participants  are and what impact the program has on schooling.  I need hard data." Later Speedy
prepares Note 2, summarizing the types of data typically used in impact evaluations.
Note 2:  Data for impact evaluation
*  Know the program well. It is risky to embark on an evaluation without knowing a lot about the
administrative/institutional details of the program; that information typically comes from the
program administration.
*  It also helps a lot to have a reasonably firm grip on the relevant "stylized facts" about the setting.
The relevant facts might include the poverty map, the way the labor market works, the major
ethnic divisions, other relevant public programs, etc.
*  Be eclectic about data. Sources can embrace both informal, unstructured, interviews with
participants in the program as well as quantitative data from representative samples.
*  However, it is extremely difficult to ask counter-factual questions in interviews or focus groups;
try asking someone who is currently participating in a public program: "what would you be doing
now if this program did not exist?"  Talking to program participants can be valuable, but it is
unlikely to provide a credible evaluation on its own.
*  One also needs data on the outcome indicators and relevant explanatory variables. You need the
latter to deal with heterogeneity in outcomes conditional on program participation. Outcomes can
differ depending on whether one is educated, say. It may not be possible to see the impact of the
program unless one controls for that heterogeneity.
*  Depending on the methods used (Note  1), you might also need data on variables that influence
participation but do not influence outcomes given participation. These instrumental variables can
be valuable in sorting out the likely causal effects of non-random programs (Note 1).
*  The data on outcomes and other relevant explanatory variables can be either quantitative or
qualitative.  But it has to be possible to organize it in some sort of systematic data structure. A
simple and common example is that one has values of various variables including one or more
outcome indicators for various observation units (individuals, households, firms, communities).
*  The variables one has data on and the observation units one uses are often chosen as part of the
evaluation method.  These choices should be anchored to the prior knowledge about the program
(its objectives of course, but also how it is run) and the setting in which it is introduced.
*  The specific source of the data on outcomes and their determinants, including program
participation, typically comes from survey data of some sort.  The observation unit could be the
household, firm, geographic area, depending on the type of program one is studying.
*  Survey data can often be supplemented with useful other data on the program (such as from the
project monitoring data base) or setting (such as from geographic data bases).
There is a promising  lead in the MSD file. Nine months ago the first national household
survey of Labas was done by the Labas Bureau  of Statistics (LBS). It is called the Living Standards
Survey (LSS). The survey was done for a random sample of 10,000 households,  and it asked about
household  incomes by source, employment,  expenditures,  health status, education attainments, and
5demographic  and other attributes of the family. There is a letter in the file from MSD to LBS, a few
months prior to the LSS, asking for a question  to be added on whetler or not the sampled household
had participated  in PROSCOL.  The reply from LBS indicates  that the listing  of income sources in the
survey schedule  will include a line item for money received from PROSCOL.
"Wow", says Speedy, and she heads off to LBS.
Speedy Analyst already knows  a few things about the LSS, having  used tabulations from it
produced by LBS. But Speedy worries  that she will not be able to do a good evaluation of
PROSCOL  without access to the raw household-level  data. But after a protracted  and unsuccessful
discussion  with the head of the LBS unit in charge of the survey, and seemingly  endless follow-up
phone calls, Speedy starts to worry  whether  she will get the data, and have anything on outcomes
worth showing  her boss.
However,  after a formal request from the Minister (which Speedy wrote for him to sign), the
Secretary  of Statistics finally agrees  to give her the micro data. Then, after a few more phone calls,
LBS also gives her a copy of the documentation  she needs to read  the data.
Speedy already knows how to use a statistics package called SAPS. After a long and painful
day figuring  out how to use the raw LSS data, Speedy starts the real work.  She uses SAPS to make a
cross-tab  of the average amount received  from PROSCOL by deciles of households, where the
deciles are formed by ranking all households  in the sample according  to their income per person. In
calculating  the latter, Speedy decides  to subtract any monies received  from PROSCOL; this, she
reckons, will be a good measure of income in the absence of the program. So she hopes to reveal
who gained  according to their pre-intervention  income.
The cross-tab suggests  that the cash transfers under the program  are quite well targeted to the
poor. By the official LBS poverty  line, about  30% of Northwest  Labas' population is poor. From her
table, she calculates that the poorest 30% of the LSS sample receive  70% of the PROSCOL transfers.
This looks like good news for PROSCOL,  Speedy reflects.
6What about the impact on schooling? She makes another table, giving average school
enrollment  rates of various age groups  for PROSCOL families  versus non-PROSCOL  families. This
suggests  almost no difference  between  the two; the average enrollment  rate for kids aged 6-18 is
about 80% in both cases.
Speedy then calculates average  years of schooling at each age and plots the results separately
for PROSCOL  families and non-PROSCOL  families. The two figures are not identical, but they are
very close.
"Was there really no impact  on schooling,  or have I done something  wrong?" she asks
herself. The question is just the beginning  of the story of how Speedy  Analyst solves the mystery  of
the vanishing  schooling benefits from PROSCOL.
Speedy  Analyst  visits  Mr.  Unbiased  Statistica
Speedy decides to show her curious  results to a couple of trusted colleagues. First she visits
Mr. Unbiased Statistica, a senior statistician  at LBS. Speedy likes Statistica,  and feels comfortable
asking him about statistical problems.
"Mr Statistica, my calculations  from the LSS suggest that PROSCOL  kids are no more likely
to be in school than non-PROSCOL  kids. Have I done something  wrong?"
Statistica  tells her bluntly:  "Speedy, I think you may well have a serious bias here. To know
what impact  PROSCOL has, you need  to know what would have happen without  the program. The
gain in schooling  attributable to the program  is just the difference  between  the actual school
attendance rate for participating  kids and the rate for those same kids if the program had not existed.
"What you are doing Speedy  is using non-PROSCOL  families  as the comparison group for
inferring  what the schooling would  be of the PROSCOL  participants if the program had not existed.
This assumes  that the non-participants  correctly  reveal, at least on average, schooling without the
program. Some simple algebra might help make this clear."
7Mr. Statistica  starts writing. "Let Pi  denote PROSCOL  participation  of the i'th child. This can
take two possible values, namely Pi=I when the child participates in PROSCOL  and Pi=0 when she
does not. When the i'th child does not participate,  her level of schooling is S0i  which stands for child
i's schooling  S when P=O. When the child does participate  her schooling is Sli. The gain in
schooling due to PROSCOL  for a child that does in fact participate  is:
G, = SIi-So,  J  Pi=l
"Why do you need this  I "? asks Speedy.
"That stands for 'given that' or 'conditional on' if you prefer.  The'  'is  needed to make
it clear that we are calculating the gain for a child who actually participated.  If we want to know
the average gain we simply take the mean of all the G's.  This will give you the sample mean
gain in schooling amongst all those who participated in PROSCOL.  As long as you have
calculated this mean correctly (using the appropriate sample weights from your survey) it will
provide an unbiased estimate of the true mean gain. The latter is what statisticians often call the
"expected value" of G, and it can be written as:
G = E(SI -Soi  I  Pi=1)
You can think of this as another way of saying 'mean'.  However, it need not be exactly equal to the
mean you calculate  from your sample data, given  that there will be some sampling  error. In the
evaluation literature, E(S1-So, I  Pi=l) is sometimes called the 'treatment effect' or the 'average
treatment effect on the treated'."
Speedy thinks to herself that the government  would not like to call PROSCOL  a "treatment".
But she is elated by Statistica's last equation. "Yes Mr. Statistica,  that is exactly  what I want to
know."
8"Ah, but that is not what you have calculated  Speedy. You have not calculated  G but rather
the difference in mean schooling  between kids in PROSCOL  families and those in non-PROSCOL
families. This is the sample estimate of:
D = E(Sli I  Pi=l) - E(So 0 I  Pi=O)
There is a simple identity  linking the D and G, namely:
D=G+B
This term 'B'  is the bias in your estimate, and it is given  by:
B = E(Soj  I  Pi=1  ) - E(So,  I  P 1=0)
In other words, the bias is the expected  difference  in schooling  without PROSCOL  between children
who did in fact participate  in the program and those who did not. You could correct for this bias if
you knew E(So 0 I  P,=l).  But you can't even get a sample  estimate of that. You can't observe what the
schooling would have been of kids who actually participated  in PROSCOL had they not participated;
that is missing data - it is called a 'counter-factual' mean."
Speedy sees that Statistica  has a legitimate  concern.  In the absence of the program,
PROSCOL  parents may well send their kids to school less than do other parents. If so, then there will
be a bias in her calculation.  What the Finance Minister  needs to know is the extra schooling  due to
PROSCOL. Presumably  this only affects those families  who actually participate.  So the Minister
needs to know how much less schooling  could be expected  without the program.  If there is no bias,
then the extra schooling  under the program is the difference  in mean schooling  between  those who
participated  and those who did not. So the bias arises if there is a difference in mean schooling
between PROSCOL  parents and non-PROSCOL  in the absence  of the program.
"What can be done to get rid of this bias, Mr. Statistica?"
"Well, the best way is to assign the program  randomly.  Then participants  and non-
participants will have the same expected schooling  in the absence of the program,  i.e., E(So 0 I  P=l)  =
E(So,  I  Pi=O). The schooling  of non-participating  families  will then correctly  reveal the counter-
9factual, i.e., the schooling  that we would have observed for participants  had they not had access  to
the program. Indeed, random assignment  will equate the whole distribution,  not just the means.
There will still be a bias due to sampling  error, but for large enough samples  you can safely assume
that any statistically  significant  difference  in the distribution  of schooling  between participants  and
non-participants  'is due to the program."
On recalling what she read in the .PROSCOL  file, Speedy  realizes  that she need look no
further than the design of the program  to see that participation  is not random. Indeed, it would be a
serious criticism of PROSCOL  to find that it was. The very fact of its purposive  targeting to poor
families,  who are presumably less likely to send their kids to school,  would create bias.
She tells Mr. Statistica  about  the program's purposive  placement.
"So, Speedy, if PROSCOL  is working well then you should  expect participants to have worse
schooling  in the absence of the program. Then E(Soi  I  P, =1) < E(Soi  I  Pi =0) and your calculation  will
underestimate  the gain from the program. You may find little or no benefit even though the program
is actually working well."
Speedy returns to her office, despondent.  She sees now that the magnitude of this bias that
Mr. Statistica is worried about could  be huge. Her reasoning  is as follows: Suppose  that poor families
send their kids to work rather than school; because they are poor and cannot  borrow easily, they need
the extra cash now. Non-poor families  send their kids to school. The program  selects poor families,
who then send their kids to school.  One observes negligible  difference  in mean schooling  between
PROSCOL  families and non-PROSCOL  families; indeed, E(Sj 1 I Pi =1)  = E(So  i I Pi =0) in
expectation. But the impact of the program is positive, and is given  by E(Soi  I  Pi =0) - E(Soi  I  Pi =1).
The failure to take account of the program's purposive, pro-poor,  targeting could well have led to a
very substantial under-estimation  of PROSCOL's benefits from her comparison  of mean schooling
between PROSCOL families and non-PROSCOL  families.
10A visit to Ms Tangential  Economiste
Next Speedy visits a colleague  at the Ministry of Finance,  Tangential  Economiste. Tangential
specializes  in public finance. She has a reputation  as a sharp economist in the Ministry, though
sometimes a little brutal in her comments  on her colleague's work.
Speedy first shows her the cross-tab  of amounts received  from PROSCOL  against income.
Tangential immediately  brings up a concern,  which she chastises Speedy for ignoring.  "You have
clearly overestimated  the gains to the poor from PROSCOL  because  you have ignored foregone
income, Speedy. Kids have to go to school  if the family is to get the PROSCOL  transfer. So they
will not be able to work, either on the family  business or in the labor market. Kids aged 15-18 can
earn two-thirds or more of the adult wage in agriculture and construction,  for example. PROSCOL
families will lose this income from their kids' work. You should  take account of this foregone
income when you calculate the net income  gains from the program.  And you should subtract this net
income gain, not the gross transfer,  to work out pre-intervention  income. Only  then will you know
how poor the family would have been is in the absence of the PROSCOL  transfer. I reckon this table
might greatly overstate the program's gains to the poor."
"But why should I factor out the foregone income from child labor? Less child labor is
surely a good thing," Speedy says in defense.
"You should certainly look at the gains from reducing child labor Speedy, of which the
main gain is no doubt the extra schooling, and hence higher future incomes of currently poor
families. I see your next table is about that. As I see it, you are concerned with the two main
ways PROSCOL reduces poverty: one is by increasing the current incomes of the poor, and the
other is by increasing their future incomes. The impact on child labor matters to both, but in
opposite directions. So PROSCOL faces a trade off."
11Speedy realizes that this is another reason why she needs to get a good estimate of the
impact on schooling; only then will she be able to determine the foregone income that Tangential
is so worried about. Maybe the extra time at school comes out of non-work time.
Next, Speedy tells Tangential about Mr. Statistica's concerns about her second table, to
see what she thinks.
"I think your main problem  here is that you have not allowed for all the other determinants  of
schooling,  besides participation  in PROSCOL. You should run a regression  of years of schooling  on
a set of control variables as well as whether or not the child's family was covered by PROSCOL.
Why not try this regression?" Tangential  writes. "For the i'th child in your sample let:
Si = a + bPi + cX, + si
Here a, b and c are parameters,  X stands  for the control variables,  such as age of the child, mother's
and father's education,  the size and demographic  composition  of the household and school
characteristics,  while  E is a residual  that includes other determinants  of schooling,  and measurement
errors. You can see Speedy that the estimated  value of b gives you the impact of PROSCOL  on
schooling."
"No, I don't see that," Speedy  interjects.
"Well, if the family of the i'th child participates in PROSCOL  then P=1 and so its schooling
will be a + b + cX, +  si. If it does not participate,  then P=O  and so its schooling will be a + cX 1 +  £i.
The difference  between the two is the gain in schooling  due to the program,  which is just b."
This discussion puts Speedy in a more hopeful mood, as she returns to her office to try out
Tangential's equation. She runs the REGRESS  command in SAPS  on the regression with and
without the control variables Tangential  suggested. When she runs it without them, she finds that the
estimated  value of b is not significantly  different from zero (using  the standard  t-test given by SAPS).
This looks suspiciously like the result she first got, taking the difference  in means between
12participants and nonparticipants  - suggesting  that PROSCOL  is not having any impact on
schooling. However, when she puts a bunch of control variables in the regression, she immediately
sees a positive and significant  coefficient  on PROSCOL  participation. She calculates that by 18
years of age, the program has added  two years to schooling.
Speedy thinks that this is starting  to look more convincing.  But she feels a little unsure about
what she is doing. "Why do these control variables make such a difference? And have I used the
right controls? I need more help if I am going to figure out what exactly is going on here, and
whether I should believe  this regression."
Professor Chisquare helps interpret Speedy's results
Speedy decides to visit Professor Chisquare,  who was one of her teachers at LNU. Chisquare
is a funny little man, who wears old-fashioned  suits and ties that don't match too often. "It is  just not
normal to be so square", she recalls thinking during his classes in econometrics. Speedy also recalls
her dread at asking Chisquare  anything,  because his answers  were sometimes very hard to
understand.  "But he knows more about regressions than anyone  else I know", Speedy reflects.
She arranges a meeting. Having heard on the phone what her problem is, Chisquare  greets his
ex-student  with a long list of papers to read, mostly with rather impenetrable  titles, and published in
seemingly  obscure places.
"Thanks very much Professor,  but I don't think I will have time to read all this before my
report is due. Can I tell you my problem, and get your reactions now?"
Chisquare agrees. Speedy  shows him the regressions,  thinking  that he will be pleased that his
ex-student  has been running regressions. He asks her a few questions  about what she had done, and
then rests back in his chair, ready, it seems, to pronounce  judgement on her efforts so far.
13"One concern I have with your regression  of schooling  on P and X is that it does not allow
the impact of the program to vary with X; the impact is the same for everyone,  which does not seem
very likely."
"Yes, I wondered about that," chips in Speedy. "Parents with more schooling  would be more
likely to send their kids to school, so the gains to them from PROSCOL  will be lower".
"Quite possibly, Ms Analyst. To allow  the gains to vary with X, let mean schooling of non-
participants  be ao + coXi  while that of participants  is a, + c1Xi, so the observed  level of schooling is:
Si = (a,  + ciXi  + sli)Pi  +  (ao + coX  + coi)(1 - Pi)
where &o  and si are random errors, each with means of zero and uncorrelated  with X.  To estimate this
model, all you have to do is add an extra term for the interaction  effects between  program
participation  and observed characteristics  to the regression  you have already run. So the augmented
regression is:
Si = ao + (al-  ao)Pi  + coXY  + (c]  - co)PAX  +  £i
where  &i  = cl,Pi + Foi  (1 - P,).  Then (a, - ao) + (cl - co)X is the mean program impact at any given
value of X. If you use the mean X in your sample  of participants  then you will have their mean gain
from the program.
"A second concern Ms Analyst is in how you have estimated  your regression. The
REGRESS command  in SAPS is just Ordinary  Least Squares. You should  recall from when you did
my Econometrics  class that OLS estimates  of the parameters  will be biased even in large samples
unless the right-hand  side variables are exogenous."
"Yes, I think I do recall that; but can you remind me what 'exogenous' means?"
"It means that the right-hand-side  variables are determined  independently  of schooling
choices and so they are uncorrelated  with the error term in the schooling  regression.  Is PROSCOL
participation  exogenous Ms Analyst?"
14Speedy  thinks quickly, recalling her conversation  with Mr. Statistica. "No. Participation was
purposively  targeted. How does that affect my calculation  of the program's impact?"
"Your equation for years of schooling  is:
Si =  a + bPi  + cXi  + ei
You used a + b + cXi + Fi as your estimate  of the i'th household's schooling  when it participates in
PROSCOL, while  you used a + cXi + si to estimate  schooling if it does not participate.  Thus the
difference, b, is the gain from the program.  However,  in making this calculation  you implicitly
assumed that ei  was the same either way. In other  words, you assumed that £ was independent  of P.
Speedy now sees that the bias due to non-random  program placement  that Unbiased Statistica
was worried about  might also be messing up her estimate based on the regression  model suggested
by Tangential  Economiste.  "Does that mean that my results are way off the mark?"
"Not necessarily," Chisquare  replies, as he goes to his white board. "Let's write down an
explicit equation for P, as, say:
P,=  d+eZi+v,
where Z is a bunch of variables that include all the observed 'poverty proxies' used for PROSCOL
targeting. Of course there will also be some purely  random error term that influences  participation;
these are poverty proxies that are not in your data, and there will also have been 'mistakes' in
selecting participants  that also end up in this v term. Notice too that this equation is linear, yet P can
only take two possible values, 0 and 1. Predicted  values between zero and one are OK, but a linear
model cannot rule out the possibility of negative  predicted  values, or values over one. There are
nonlinear models  that can deal with this problem, but to simplify the discussion  I will confine
attention  to linear models.
"Now, there is a special case in which your OLS regression of Son P and Xwill give you an
unbiased estimate of b. That is when  X includes  all the variables in Z that also influence  schooling,
15and the error term v is uncorrelated  with the error term e in your regression for schooling. This is
sometimes called 'selection on observables' in the evaluation  literature."
"Why does that eliminate  the bias?" asks Speedy.
"Well, you think about it. Suppose  that the control variables  X in your regression for
schooling include all the observed variables Z that influence  participation  P and v is uncorrelated
with £ (so that the unobserved  variables affecting  program  placement  do not influence  schooling
conditional on X). Then you have eliminated any possibility  of P being correlated with E. It will now
be exogenous in your regression  for schooling.
"To put it another way, Ms Analyst, the key idea of selection  on observables  is that there is
some observable  X such that the bias vanishes conditional  on X."
"Why did it make such a difference  when I added  the control variables to my regression of
schooling on PROSCOL  participation?"
"Because your X must include  variables that were amongst  the poverty proxies used for
targeting, or were correlated  with them, and they are variables  that also influenced  schooling.
"However,  Ms Analyst, all this only works if the assumptions  are valid. There are two
problems you should be aware of. Firstly, the above method  breaks down if there are no unobserved
determinants of participation;  in other words if the error term v has zero variance, and all of the
determinants  of participation  also affect schooling. Then there is no independent  variation in
program participation  to allow one to identify its impact  on schooling;  you can predict P perfectly
from X, and so the regression will not estimate. This problem is unlikely to arise often, given that
there are almost always unobserved  determinants of program  placement.
"The second problem is more common, and more worrying  in your case. The error term £ in
the schooling regression probably  contains  variables that are not found in the LSS, but might well
influence  participation  in the program, i.e., they might be correlated  with the error term v in the
participation equation. If that is the case then the error term £ will not have zero mean given  X and P,
16and so ordinary regression methods  will still be biased when estimating  your regressions  for
schooling. So the key issue is the extent of the correlation  between  the error term in the equation for
participation  and that in the equation  for schooling."
Speedy learns about better methods of forming a comparison group
Next Speedy  tells Chisquare  about her first attempt  at estimating  the benefits. "How might I
form a better comparison  group?"
"You want to compare schooling  levels conditional  on observed characteristics. Imagine that
you divide the sample into groups  of families with the same  or similar values of Xand you then
compare the conditional means for PROSCOL and non-PROSCOL  families. If schooling  in the
absence of the program  is independent  of participation,  given  X, then the comparison  will give an
unbiased estimate of PROSCOL's impact. This is sometimes  called 'conditional independence', and
it is the key assumption  made by all comparison-group  methods."
Speedy tries to summarize.  "So a better way to select my comparison  group, given the data I
have, is to use as a control  for each participant, a non-participant  with the same observed
characteristics. But that would surely be very hard Professor, since I could have a lot of those
variables. There may be nobody amongst  the non-participants  with exactly the same values of all the
observed characteristics  for any one of the PROSCOL  participants"
"Ah", says Chisquare,  "some clever statisticians  have figured out how you can simplify the
problem greatly. Instead  of aiming to assure that the matched  control for each participant has exactly
the same value of X, you can get the same result by matching  on the predicted value of P, given  X,
which is called the propensity  score of X. You should  read the papers by Rosenbaum and Rubin on
the list I prepared for you. Their Biometrika 1983  paper shows that if (in your case) schooling
without PROSCOL is independent  of participation  given  Xthen they are also independent  of
participation  given the propensity  score of X.  Since the propensity  score is  just one number, it is far
17easier to control for it than X, which could  be many  variables as you say. And yet propensity  score
matching is sufficient to eliminate the bias provided  there is conditional  independence  given  X."
"Let me see if I understand  you, Professor.  I first regress P on Xto get the predicted value of
P for each possible value of X, which I then estimate for my whole sample. For each participant, I
then find the non-participant with the closest  value of this predicted  probability.  The difference in
schooling is then the estimated gain from the program for that participant."
"That is basically right, Ms Analyst.  You can then take the mean of all those differences to
estimate the impact. Or you can take the mean for different income groups,  say. But you have to be
careful with how you estimate the model of participation.  A linear model could give you crazy
predicted  probabilities,  above one, or negative.  It is better to use the LOGIT command in SAPS. This
assumes that the error term v in the participation  equation has a logistic  distribution,  and estimates
the parameters  consistent with that assumption  by maximum  likelihood  methods.  You remember  my
class on maximum  likelihood estimation  of binary response models  don't you Ms Analyst?"
"Yes, I do", says Speedy, as convincingly  as she can.
"Another issue you should be aware of Ms Analyst is that some of the non-participants  may
have to be excluded as potential matches right from the start. Some will be ineligible according to
the eligibility  rules. Others will be eligible,  but have observable  characteristics  that make
participation  unlikely. In fact there are important  recent results in the literature  indicating that failure
to compare participants  and controls at common  values of matching  variables is a major source of
bias in evaluations.  See the Heckman  et al. (1998) paper on my reading list.
"The intuition is that you want the comparison  group to be as similar as possible to the
treatment group in terms of their likelihood  of participating in the program,  as summarized  by the
propensity  score. You might find that some of the non-participant  sample  has a lower propensity
score than any of those in the treatment sample. This is sometimes  called 'lack of common support'.
In forming your comparison group, you should  eliminate  those observations  from the set of non-
18participants  to assure that you are only comparing  gains over the same range of propensity scores.
You should certainly  exclude those non-participants  for whom the probability  of participating is zero.
It is probably  also a good idea to trim a little, say 2%, of the sample from the top and bottom of the
non-participant  distribution in terrns of the propensity  scores. Once you have identified participants
and non-participants  over a common  matching  region, I recommend  you take an average of (say) the
five or so nearest neighbors in terms of the absolute  difference in propensity  scores."
"What should I include in X?" Speedy  asks.
"Well clearly you should include all the variables in your data set that are, or could proxy for,
the poverty indicators that were used by MSD in selecting  PROSCOL  participants. So again X
should include  the variables in Z.
"However,  you have touched  on a weak spot of propensity  score matching. With
randomization,  the results do not depend  on what Xyou choose. With matching,  a different  Xwill
yield a different estimate of impact. Nor does randomization  require  that you specify some model for
participation,  whether a logit or something  else."
"Yes, Professor, I am convinced  that a random experiment  is the ideal. Alas, that is clearly
not the case with PROSCOL."
Speedy prepares Note 3, summarizing  the steps she needs to follow in doing propsensity
score matching.
19Note 3: Steps in matching
The aim of matching is to find the closest comparison group from a sample of non-participants to the
sample of program participants. "Closest" is measured in terms of observable characteristics. If there
are only one or two such characteristics then matching should be easy. But typically there are many
potential characteristics. The main steps in matching based on propensity scores are as follows:
Step 1: You need a representative sample survey of eligible non-participants as well as one for the
participants. The larger the sample of eligible non-participants the better, to facilitate good matching. If
the two samples come from different surveys, then they should be highly comparable surveys (same
questionnaire, same interviewers or interviewer training, same survey period and so on).
Step 2: Pool the two samples and estimate a logit model of program participation as a function of all
the variables in the data that are likely to determine participation.
Step 3: Create the predicted values of the probability of participation from the logit regression; these
are called the "propensity scores". You will have a propensity score for every sampled participant and
non-participant.
Step 4: Some of the non-participant sample may have to be excluded at the outset because they have a
propensity score which is outside the range (typically too low) found for the treatment sample. The
range of propensity scores estimated for the treatment group should correspond closely to that for the
retained sub-sample of non-participants. You may also want to restrict potential matches in other ways,
depending on the setting. For example, you may want to only allow matches within the same
geographic area to help assure that the matches come from the same economic environment.
Step 5: For each individual in the treatment sample, you now want to find the observation in the non-
participant sample that has the closest propensity score, as measured by the absolute difference in
scores. This is called the "nearest neighbor".  You can find the five (say) nearest neighbors.
Step 6: Calculate the mean value of the outcome indicator (or each of the indicators if there is more
than one) for the five nearest neighbors. The difference between that mean and the actual value for the
treated observation is the estimate of the gain due to the program for that observation.
Step 7: Calculate the mean of these individual gains to obtain the average overall gain. This can be
stratified by some variable of interest such as incomes in the non-participant sample.
This is the simplest form of propensity score matching. Complications can arise in practice. For
example, if there is over-sampling of participants then you can use choice-based sampling methods to
correct for this (Manski and Lerman, 1978); alternatively you can use the odds ratio (pl(1-p), where p is
the propensity score) for matching.  Instead of relying on the nearest neighbor you can instead use all
the non-participants as potential matches but weight them differently, according to how close they are
(Heckman et al., 1998).
Troublesome,  and not so troublesome,  unobservables
"I now have a much better idea of how to form the comparison group, Professor Chisquare.
This should give me a much better estimate of the programs'  impact."
"Ah, there  is no guarantee of that.  Recall my warning that all these methods I have described
to you so far will only eliminate the bias if there is conditional independence, such that the
20unobservable determinants  of schooling-not  included in your set of control variables  X-are
uncorrelated  with program  placement. There are two distinct sources of bias, that due to differences
in observables  and that due to differences in unobservables;  the latter is often called 'selection bias'."
Speedy's Note 4 elaborates  on this difference.
Note 4: Sources of bias in naive estimates of PROSOL's  impact
The bias described  by Mr. Statistica  is the expected  difference  in schooling  without  PROSCOL
between  families  selected  for the program  and those not chosen.  This can be broken down  into  two
sources  of bias:
*  Bias due to differences  in observable  characteristics.  This can come about  in two ways.  Firstly
there may  not be common  support.  The "support"  is the set of values  of the control  variables  for
which outcomes  and program  participation  are observed.  If the support  is different  between  the
treatment  sample  and the comparison  group  then  this will bias the results. In effect,  one is not
comparing  like with like. Secondly,  even  with common  support,  the distribution  of observable
characteristics  may be different  within  the region  of common  support; in effect  the comparison
group  data is miss-weighted.  Careful  selection  of the comparison  group can eliminate  this
source of bias.
*  Bias due to differences  in unobservables.  The  term "selection  bias" is sometimes  confined
solely  to this component  (though  some authors  use that term for  the total bias in a non-
experimental  evaluation).  This source  of bias arises  when,  for given  values of X,  there is a
systematic  relationship  between  program  participation  and outcomes  in the absence  of the
program.  In other  words,  there are unobserved  variables  that jointly influence  schooling  and
program  participation  conditional  on the observed  variables  in the data.
There is nothing  to guarantee  that these  two sources  of bias will  work in the same  direction.  So
eliminating  either one of them on its own does not mean  that the total bias is reduced  in absolute
value. That is an empirical  question.  In one of the few studies  to address  this question,  the true
impact,  as measured  by a well-designed  experiment,  was  compared  to various non-experimental
estimates (Heckman  et al., 1998). The bias in the naMve  estimate  was huge, but careful  matching  of
the comparison  goup based  on observables  greatly  reduced  the bias.
Chisquare  points to his last equation. "Clearly conditional  independence  will hold if P is
exogenous, for then E(s, I  Xi, Pi) = 0. However, endogenous  program  placement due to purposive
targeting based on unobservables  will still leave a bias. This is sometimes  called 'selection on
unobservables'."
21Speedy interjects.  "So really the conditions  required for  justifying the method suggested  by
Ms Economiste  are no less restrictive  than those needed to justify a version of my first method based
on comparing  PROSCOL families  with non-PROSCOL  families  for households  with similar values
of X. Both rest on believing that these unobservables  are not jointly influencing  schooling  and
program participation,  conditional  on X."
"That's right, Ms Analyst. Intuitively,  one might think that careful matching reduces the
bias, but that is no necessarily so. Matching  eliminates part of the bias in your first naYve  estimate of
PROSCOL's impact. That leaves the bias due to any troublesome  unobservables.  However, these two
sources of bias could be offsetting,  one positive the other negative. Heckman et al. (1998) make this
point. So the matching estimate could well have more bias than the naYve  estimate. One cannot know
on a priori grounds how much better off one is with even a well chosen comparison  group. That is an
empirical question."
Speedy regrets  that a baseline  survey was not done
Speedy is starting to feel more  than a little desperate. "Is there any method besides
randomization  that is robust to these troublesome  unobservables?"  she asks the Professor.
"There is something you can do if you have 'baseline data' for both the participants and non-
participants,  collected before PROSCOL  started. The idea is that you collect  data on outcomes and
their determinants  both before and after the program is introduced,  and you collect that data for an
untreated  comparison group as well as the treatment group. Then you can just subtract the difference
between  the schooling of participants  and the comparison  group before  the program is introduced
from the difference  after the program. This is called the 'double difference' estimate, or just 'double
diff' by people  who like to abbreviate  things. This will deal with the troublesome  unobserved
variables  provided they do not vary over time."
22Chisquare  turns to his whiteboard  again pointing to one of his earlier equations. "To see how
this works, let's add time subscripts,  so schooling  after the program is introduced  is:
Sia = a + bPi + cXia + Eia
Before the program, in the baseline survey, school attainment is instead:
Sib = a +  CXib  +  Eib
(Of course P=O  before the program is introduced.) The error terms include  an additive time invariant
effect, so we can write them as:
ci,  =  1i + 4it (for t=a,b)
where mi  is the time invariant effect,  which is allowed to be correlated  with Pi, and ,it is an
innovation  error, which is not correlated  with Pi (or Xi).
"The essential idea here is to use the baseline data to reveal those troublesome
unobservables. Notice that since the baseline survey is for the same  households  as you have now, the
i'th household in the equation for Si, is the same household as the i'th in the equation for Sib. You can
then take the difference between the 'after' equation and the 'before' equation;  you get:
Sia  - Sib  = bPi  + C(Xia - Xib)  +  -li.  - 4ib
So now you can regress the change in schooling  on program  participation  and the changes in X. OLS
will give you an unbiased estimate  of the program's impact. The troublesome  unobservables  - the
ones correlated  with program participation  - have been conveniently  swept away."
Speedy reflects: "If the program  placement was based only on variables,  both observed and
unobserved,  that were known at the time of the baseline survey then it would be reasonable to
assume that the il's do not change between  the two surveys."
Professor Chisquare  nods. "Yes, as long as the troublesome unobservables  are time invariant,
the changes  in schooling over time for the comparison group will reveal what would have happened
to the treatment group without the program."
23Speedy thinks to herself that this means one needs to know the program well, and be able to
time the evaluation  surveys so as to coordinate  with the program. Otherwise there are bound to be
unobserved changes  after the baseline survey that influence  who gets the program.  This would create
rl's that changed between  the two surveys.
Something  about Chisquare's last equation is worrying  her. "As I understand  it Professor,
this last equation  means that the child and household  characteristics  in Xare irrelevant  to the change
in schooling if those characteristics  do not change over time. But the gain in schooling  may depend
on parents' education  (and not just any change in their education)  and possibly on where the
household lives, as this will determine  the access to schools."
"Yes, Ms Analyst, there can be situations  in which the changes over time in the outcome
indicator are influenced  by the initial conditions.  Then one will also want to control for differences in
initial conditions. You can do this simply by adding  X, and  Xb  in the regression separately,  so that
the regression takes the form:
Si. - Sib  = bPi  +  CaX.a  +  CbXib  +  pLia  .-  jib
So even if some (or all) variables inXdo  not vary over time one can still allow  Xto affect the
changes over time in schooling.
"The propensity-score  matching  method that I told you about can help assure  that the
comparison group is similar to the treatment group before you do the double difference.  In an
interesting  study of an American employment  program,  it was found that failure to assure  that
comparisons  were made in a region of common support was a major source of bias in the double
difference estimate  when compared to a randomized  control group. Within the region  of common
support, however, the bias conditional on Xdid not vary much over time. So taking the double
difference makes sense, after the matching is done. See the paper by Heckman et al., in
Econometrica 1998  on my reading list."
24Speedy has had some experience  doing surveys,  and is worried about this idea of following
up households. "When doing the follow-up survey, it must not be easy to find all those households
who were originally  included in the baseline survey. Some people in the baseline survey may not
want to be interviewed  again, or they have moved to an unknown  location. Is that a problem?"
"If the drop outs are purely random then the follow up survey will still be representative  of
the same population  in the baseline survey. However,  if there is some systematic  tendency for
people with certain characteristics  to drop out of the sample  then there will be a problem.  This is
called 'attrition bias'. For example,  PROSCOL  might help some poor families  move into better
housing. And even when participant selection  was solely  based on information  available at or around
the baseline date (the  time-invariant effect Tij),  selected  participants  may well drop out voluntarily  on
the basis of changes  after that date. Such attrition from the treatment group will clearly bias a double-
difference estimate of the program's impact."
Later Speedy  writes up Note 5, on the steps to form a double-difference  estimate.
Note 5:  Doing a double difference
The "double  difference"  method  entails  comparing  a treatment  group  with a comparison  group  (as
might ideally  be determined  by the matching  method  in Note 3) both before  and after the intervention.
The main steps are as follows:
Step 1: You need  a "baseline"  survey  before  the intervention  is in place, and the survey  must cover
both non-participants and participants. If you do not know who will participate, you have to make an
informed guess. Talk to the program administrators.
Step 2: You then need one or more follow-up surveys, after the program is put in place.  These should
be highly comparable to the baseline surveys (in terms of the questionnaire, the interviewing, etc).
Ideally the follow-up surveys should be of the same sampled observations as the baseline survey.  If
this is not possible then they should be the same geographic clusters, or strata in terms of some other
variable.
Step 3: Calculate the mean difference between the "after" and "before" values of the outcome
indicator for each of the treatment and comparison groups.
Step 4: Calculate the difference between these two mean differences.  That is your estimate of the
impact of the program.
This is the simplest version of double-difference. You may also want to control for differences in
exogenous  initial  conditions,  or changes  in exogenous  variables,  possibly  allowing  for interaction
effects  with the program  (so that the gain from  the intervention  is some function  of observable
variables). A suitable  regression  model  can allow  these  variations.
25Chisquare reminds Speedy about instrumental variables
"Double difference is neat, Professor Chisquare. But I don't have a baseline survey of the
same households. I don't think anyone  thought  PROSCOL  would have  to be evaluated when they
started the program. Is there anything  else I can do to get an estimate  that is robust to the troublesome
unobservables?"
"What you then need is an instrumental  variable (IV)" he tells Speedy. "You must surely
recall from my classes that this is the classic solution for the problem of an endogenous regressor."
"Can you just remind me, Professor  Chisquare?"
"An instrumental  variable is really  just some observable  source of exogeneous  variation in
program participation. In other  words, it is correlated with P but is not already in the regression  for
schooling,  and is not correlated  with the error term in the schooling  equation, s.  So you must have to
have at least one variable in Z that is not in X, and is not correlated  with s. Then the Instrumental
Variables Estimate of the program's impact  is obtained by replacing  P by its predicted value
conditional  on Z.  Since  this predicted  value depends solely  on Z (which is exogenous) and Z is
uncorrelated  with e, it is now reasonable  to apply ordinary least squares  to this new regression."
"I see," says Speedy. "Since  the predicted values depend  only on the exogenous variation
due to the instrumental  variable,  and the other exogenous  variables,  the unobservables  are no longer
troublesome, since they will be uncorrelated  with the error term in the schooling  regression."
"You've got it Ms Analyst. That also suggests another, more  efficient, way you can deal
with the problem. Remember  that the source of bias in your estimate  of the program's impact  was the
correlation  between the error term in the schooling equation and that in the participation equation.
This is what creates the correlation  between  participation  and the error term in the schooling
equation. So a natural way to get rid of the problem when you have an instrumental  variable is to add
the residuals  from the first stage equation  for participation  to the equation  for schooling. You still
26leave actual  participation in the schooling  regression. But since  you have now added to the schooling
regression  the estimated value of the error term from the participation  equation, you can treat
participation  as exogenous and run OLS. Of course, this only works if you have a valid instrument.
If you don't, the regression will not estimate,  since the participation  residual will be perfectly
predictable from actual participation  and X, in a linear model.
"An IV can also help if you think  there is appreciable  measurement  error in your program
participation  data. This is another  possible source of bias. Measurement  error means that you think
that program  participation varies more  than it actually does. This overestimation  in the variance of P
leads naturally  to an underestimation  of its coefficient b."
"Yes, you called that 'attenuation  bias' in your class, as I recall,  because this bias attenuates
the estimated  regression coefficient."
"That's right. So you can see how useful an instrumental  variable  can be.  However,  you do
have to be a little careful in practice. When  you just replace the actual  participation  with its predicted
value and run OLS you will not give the correct standard errors since  the computer will not know
that you had to use previously estimated  parameters  to obtain  the predicted  values. A correction  to
the OLS standard errors is required,  though there are statistical  packages  that allow you to do this
easily, at least for linear models.
"However, if you had a dependent  variable that could only take two possible values, at school
or not at school say, then you should use nonlinear binary response  model, such as Logit or Probit.
The principle  of testing for exogeneity  of program participation  is similar in this case. There is a
paper by Rivers and Vuong (1988)  that discusses  the problem for such models;  Blundell and Smith
(1993)  provide a useful overview  of various nonlinear models in which there is an endogenous
regressor. I have written a program,  in the programming language  called Gauss, that can do a probit
with an endogenous regressor and I can give you a copy."
27"Thanks. I guess I will cross that bridge  when I get to it. But what should  I use as an
instrument?" asks Speedy.
"Ah, that you will have to figure out yourself Ms Analyst".
Speedy later summarizes what she has leant about alternative  methods,  as in Note 1.
Speedy returns to her computer
Speedy is starting  to wonder whether  this will ever end. "I'm learning  a lot, but what am I
going to tell my boss?"
Speedy tries to think of an instrumental  variable. But every possibility  she can think of could
just as well be put in with the variables in X. She now remembers  Professor Chisquare's class; her
problem is finding a valid "exclusion restriction",  which  justifies putting some variable  in the
equation for participation,  but not in the equation for schooling.
Speedy decides to try the "propensity  score matching  method" suggested  by Chisquare.  Her
logit model of participation  looks quite sensible,  and suggests  that PROSCOL is well targeted.
(Virtually all of the variables that she would expect to be associated  with poverty have positive, and
significant, coefficients.) This is interesting  in its own right. She then does the propensity  score
matching  just as Professor Chisquare  had advised  her. On comparing  the mean school enrollment
rates, Speedy finds that kids of the matched  comparison  group had an enrollment  rate of 60%, as
compared to the figure of 80% for PROSCOL  families.
She now thinks back on those comments  that Ms Tangential Economiste  had made about
foregone income. She finds that the Bureau  of Statistics  did a special survey of child labor that asked
about earnings.  (There is an official  ban on kids working before they are 16 years of age in Labas,
but the government  has a hard time enforcing  it; nonetheless,  child wages are a sensitive issue.)
From this she can figure out what earnings  a child would have had if she had not gone to school.
28So Speedy  can now subtract from PROSCOL's  cash payment to participants  the amount of
foregone income,  and so work out the net income transfer. Subtracting  this net transfer from total
income, she can now work out where the PROSCOL  participants  come from in the distribution of
pre-intervention  income. They are not quite as poor as she had first thought (ignoring  foregone
income) but they are still poor; for example,  two-thirds  of them are below Labas' official  poverty
line.
Having calculated  the net income gain to all participants,  Speedy can now calculate  the
poverty rate with and without PROSCOL. The "post-intervention"  poverty rate (with the program) is
just the proportion  of the population living in households  with an income per person below the
poverty line, where "income" is the observed income  (including the gross transfer receipts from
PROSCOL). This she calculates directly  from the LSS. By subtracting  the net income gain (cash
transfer from PROSCOL  minus foregone  income from kids' work) attributed  to PROSCOL  from all
the observed incomes  she gets a new distribution  of pre-intervention  incomes.  The poverty rate
without the program  is then the proportion  of people living in poor households,  based on this new
distribution. Speedy finds that the observed poverty  rate in Northwest Labas of 32% would have
been 36% if PROSCOL  had not existed. The program  allows 4% of the population  to escape poverty
now. The schooling  gains mean that there will also be both pecuniary and non-pecuniary  gains to the
poor in the future.
Speedy recalls a class Chisquare  gave on poverty  measurement,  in which he pointed out that
the proportion of people below the poverty line is a rather crude measure, since it tells you nothing
about changes  below the line. Note 6 reproduces  (after some tidying up) Speedy's class notes.
When Speedy calculates  both the poverty gap index  and the squared poverty  gap index  the results
suggest that these have also fallen as a result of PROSCOL.
29Note 6:  Poverty  measures
The simplest and most common poverty measure is the headcount index. In Labas this is the proportion
of the population living in households with income per person below the poverty line. (In other countries,
it is a consumption-based measure, which has some advantages; for discussion and references see
Ravallion, 1994.)
The headcount index does not tell us anything about income distribution below the poverty line: a poor
person may be worse off but the headcount index will not change; not will it reflect gains amongst the
poor, unless they cross the poverty line.
A widely used alternative to the headcount index is the poverty gap index (PG). The poverty gap for each
household is the difference between the poverty line and the household's income; for those above the
poverty line the gap is zero. When the poverty gap is normalized by the poverty line, and one calculates
its mean over all households (whether poor or not), one obtains the poverty gap index.
The poverty gap index will tell you how much impact the program has had on the depth of poverty, but it
will not reflect any changes in distribution amongst the poor due to the program. For example, if the
program entails a small gain to a poor person who is above the mean income of the poor, at the expense
of an equal loss to someone below that mean, then PG will not change.
There are various "distribution-sensitive" measures that will reflect such changes in distribution amongst
the poor. One such measure is the squared poverty gap  (Foster et al., 1984). This is calculated the same
way as PG except that the individual poverty gaps as a proportion of the poverty line are squared before
taking the mean (again over both poor and non-poor.)  Another example of a distribution-sensitive
poverty measure is the Watts index. This is the mean of the log of the ratio of the poverty line to income,
where that ratio is set to one for the non-poor. Atkinson (1987) describes other examples in the literature.
Speedy also recognizes that there  is some uncertainty about the LBS poverty  line.  So she
repeats this calculation over a wide range of poverty  lines.  She finds that at a poverty line for which
50% of the population  are poor based on the observed post-intervention incomes, the proportion
would have been 52% without  PROSCOL.  At a poverty  line which 15% fail to reach with the
program,  the proportion would have been 19% without it.  By repeating these calculations over the
whole range of incomes, Speedy realizes that she has traced out the entire "poverty  incidence curves"
with and without the program,  which are just the same thing statisticians call the "cumulative
distribution function".
Note 7 summarizes the steps Speedy takes in making comparisons of poverty with and
without PROSCOL.
30Note 7:  Comparing  poverty with and without the program
Using the methods described in the main text and earlier Notes one obtains an estimate of the gain to each
household. In the simplest evaluations this is just one number. But it is better to allow it to vary with
household characteristics.  You can then summarize this informnation  in the form of poverty incidence curves
(PICs), with and without the program.
Step 1: You should already have the post-intervention income (or other welfare indicator) for each
household in the whole sample (comprising both participants and non-participants); this is data. You also
know how many people are in each household. And, of course, you know the total number of people in the
sample (N; or this might be the estimated population size, if inverse sampling rates have been used to
"expend up" each sample observation).
Step 2: You can plot this information in the form of a PIC. This gives (on the vertical axis) the percentage of
the population living in households with an income less than or equal to that value on the horizontal axis. To
make this graph, you can start with the poorest household, mark its income on the horizontal axis, and then
count up on the vertical axis by 100  times the number of people in that household divided by N.  The next
point is the proportion living in the two poorest households, and so on.  This gives the post-intervention PIC.
Step 3: Now calculate the distribution of income pre-intervention. To get this you subtract the estimated
gain for each household from its post-intervention income. You then have a list of post-intervention
incomes, one for each sampled household.  Then repeat Step 2. You will then have the pre-intervention PIC.
If we think of any given income level on the horizontal axis as a "poverty line" then the difference between
the two PICs at that point gives the impact on the headcount index for that poverty line (Note 5).
Alternatively, looking horizontally gives you the income gain at that percentile. If none of the gains are
negative then the post-intervention PIC must lie below the pre-intervention on. Poverty will have fallen no
matter what poverty line is used. Indeed, this also holds for a very broad class of poverty measures; see
Atkinson (1987).  If some gains are negative, then the PICs will intersect.  The poverty comparison is then
ambiguous; the answer will depend on which poverty lines and which poverty measures one uses. (For
further discussion see Ravallion, 1994.) You might then use a priori restrictions on the range of admissible
poverty lines.  For example, you may be confident that the poverty line does not exceed some maximum
value, and if the intersection occurs above that value then the poverty comparison is unambiguous. If the
intersection point (and there may be more than one) is below the maximum admissible poverty line then a
robust poverty comparison is only possible for a restricted set of poverty measures.  To check how restricted
the set needs to be, you can calculate the poverty depth curves (PDCs). These are obtained by simply
forming the cumulative sum up to each point on the PIC. (So the second point on the PDC is the first point
on the PIC plus the second point, and so on.)
If the PDCs do not intersect then the program's impact on poverty is unambiguous as long as one restricts
attention to the poverty gap index or any of the distribution sensitive poverty measures described in Note 5.
If the PDCs intersect then you can calculate the "poverty severity curves" with and without the program, by
forming the cumulative sums under the PDCs.  If these do not intersect over the range of admissible poverty
lines then the impact on any of the distribution-sensitive poverty measures in Note 5 is unambiguous.
Speedy makes an appointment with Mr. Undersecretary, to present her assessment  of
PROSCOL.
31A chance encounter with Ms Sensible Sociologist
The day before she is due to present  her results to her boss, Speedy accidentally  bumps into
her old friend, Sensible Sociologist,  who now works for one of Labas' largest  NGOs, SCEF (the
Social Capital  for Empowerment  Foundation). Speedy  tells Sense all the details about what she has
been doing on PROSCOL.
Sensible  Sociologist's eyes start to roll when Speedy talks about "unbiased  estimates" and
"propensity  scores". "I don't know much about that stuff Speedy. But I do know a few things about
PROSCOL.  I have visited some of the schools in Northwest Labas where there are a lot of
PROSCOL kids, and I meet PROSCOL families  all the time in my work for SCEF.  I can tell you
they are not all poor, but most are. PROSCOL  helps.
"However, this story about 'foregone income' that Tangential came up with, I am not so sure about
that. Economists  have strange ideas sometimes.  I have seen plenty of kids from poor families who
work as well as go to school. And some of the younger ones not at school don't seem to be working
either. Maybe Tangential is right in theory, but I don't know how important  it is in reality."
"You may be right, Sense. What I need  to do is check whether  there is any difference in the
amount of child labor  done by PROSCOL  kids versus a matched comparison  group," says Speedy.
"The trouble is that the LSS did not ask about child labor. That is in another LBS survey. I think
what I will do is present the results with and without  the deduction for foregone  income."
"That might be wise" says Sensible  Sociologist.  "Another thing I have noticed Speedy is that,
for a poor family to get on PROSCOL it matters a lot which school-board  area the family lives in.
All school areas (SBA) get a PROSCOL  allocation from the center, even SBAs that have very few
poor families. If you are poor but living in a well-to-do SBA you are more likely to get help from
PROSCOL  than if you live in a poor SBA. I guess  they like to let all areas participate  for political
32reasons. As a result, it is relative poverty-relative to others in the area you live-that  matters much
more than your absolute level of living."
"No I did not know that", replies Speedy, a little embarrassed  that she had not thought of
talking to Sensible  Sociologist earlier,  since this could be important.
"That gives me an idea, Sense. I know  which school-board  area each household belongs to in
the LBS survey, and I know how much the center has allocated to each SBA. Given what you have
told me, that allocation would influence  participation  in PROSCOL,  but one would not expect it to
matter to school attendance, which would depend  more on one's absolute level of living, family
circumstances,  and I guess characteristics  of the school. So the PROSCOL  budget  allocation across
SBA's can be used as instrumental  variables  to remove the bias in my estimates  of program impact."
Sensible  Sociologist's eyes roll again, as Speedy says farewell and races back to her office.
She first looks into the original file she was given,  to see what rules are used by the center in
allocating PROSCOL  funds across SBAs. A memo from the Ministry indicates  that allocations are
based on the number of school age children,  with an "adjustment factor" for how poor the SBA is
thought to be. However, the rule is somewhat  vague.
Speedy re-runs her regression  for schooling.  But now she replaces  the actual PROSCOL
participation  by its predicted value (the propensity  score) from the regression  for participation, which
now includes  the budget allocation to the SBS. She realizes  that it helps to already have as many
school characteristics  as possible in the regression  for attendance. Although  school characteristics do
not appear to matter officially to how PROSCOL  resources are allocated, Speedy  realizes that any
omitted school characteristics  that jointly influence  PROSCOL  allocations  by SBA and individual
schooling outcomes  will leave a bias in her IV estimates. She realizes that she will never rule out the
possibility of bias, but with plenty of geographic  control variables, this method should at least offer a
credible comparator  to her matching estimate.
33Soon she has the results. Consistent  with Sense's observations,  the budget allocation  to the
SBA has a significant  positive  coefficient in the logit regression  for PROSCOL  participation. Now
(predicted)  PROSCOL  participation  is significant in a regression  for school enrolment,  in which she
includes all the same variables from the logit regression, except  the SBA budget allocation.  The
coefficient implies that the enrollment  rate is 15 percentage  points higher for PROSCOL  participants
than would have otherwise  been the case. She also runs regressions  for years of schooling,  for boys
and girls separately.  For either boys or girls of 18 years, her results indicate that they would have
dropped out of school almost two years earlier if it had not been for PROSCOL.
Speedy wonders  what Professor Chisquare  will think of this. She is sure he will find
something questionable  about her methods.  "I wonder if I am using  the right standard  errors? And
should I be using linear models?" Speedy decides she will order that new program FEM (Fancy
Econometric Methods) that she has heard about. But that will have to wait. For now, Speedy is
happy that her results are not very different from those she got using the propensity-score  matching
method. And she is re-assured somewhat  by Sense's comments  based on her observations  in the
field. "They can't all be wrong".
Speedy reports back to her boss
Speedy writes up her results and gives the report to Mr. Undersecretary. He seems quite
satisfied. "So PROSCOL  is doing quite well." Mr. Undersecretary  arranges a meeting with the
Minister, and he asks Speedy to attend. The Minister is interested  in Speedy's results, and asks some
questions about how she figured  out the benefits from PROSCOL. He seems to appreciate Speedy's
efforts to assure that the comparison  group is similar to PROSCOL  families.
"I think we should expand  PROSCOL  to include  the rest of Labas," the Minister  concludes.
"We will not be able to do it all in one go, but over about two years I think we could cover the whole
country. But I want you to keep monitoring the program Speedy."
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evaluations.  I would recommend  that you randomly exclude some eligible PROSCOL  families in the
rest of Labas. We could then do a follow up survey of both the actual participants and those
randomly excluded from participating. That would give us a more precise estimate of the benefits".
The Minister gets a dark look in his eyes, and Mr. Undersecretary  starts shifting in his seat
uncomfortably. The Minister  then bursts out laughing.  "You must be joking, Ms Analyst! I can  just
see the headlines in the Labas Herald: "Government  Randomly  Denies PROSCOL  to Families in
Desperate Need." Do you not want me to get re-elected?"
"I see your point, Minister. But since you do not have enough money to cover the whole
country in one go, you are going to have to make choices about  who gets it first.  Why not make that
choice randomly, amongst  eligible participants? What could be fairer?"
The Minister  thinks it over. "What about if we picked the schools or the school board areas
randomly, in the first wave?"
Speedy thinks. "Yes, that would surely make the choice of school or school board area a
good instrumental  variable for individual  program  placement", she says with evident enthusiasm.
"Instrumental  what?", says the Minister, while Mr. Undersecretary  shifts in his seat again.
"Never mind. If that works for you, then I will try to see if I can do it that way. The Ministry of
Social Development  will have to agree of course."
"If that does not work, Mr. Minister, could we do something  else instead, namely a baseline
survey of areas in which there are likely to be high concentrations  of PROSCOL participants  before
the program starts in the South? I would like to do this at the same  time as the next round of the
national survey I used for evaluating  PROSCOL  in north Labas. There are also a few questions I
would like to add to the survey, such as whether the children  do any paid work."
"Yes, that sounds like a reasonable request, Speedy. I will also talk to the Secretary  of
Statistics".
35Epilogue
It is three  years  later.  Speedy  Analyst  is head  of the new  Social  and  Economic  Evaluation
Unit,  which  reports  directly  to the Minister  of Finance.  The Unit  is currently  evaluating  all of Labas'
social  programs  on a regular  basis.  Speedy  has a permanent  staff  of three  assistants.  She  regularly
hires both  Professor  Chisquare  and  Sensible  Sociologist  as consultants.  They  have  a hard  time  talking
to each  other.  ("Boy,  that Chisquare  is  just not  normal"  Sense  confided  to Speedy  one  day.)  But
Speedy  finds  it useful  to have  both  of them  around.  The  qualitative  field  trips,  and  interviews  with
stake-holders,  that  Sense  favors  help  a lot in forming  hypotheses  to be tested  and assessing  the
plausibility  of key assumptions  made  in  the quantitative  analysis  that Chisquare  favors. Speedy
reflects  that  the real  problem  with MSD's  "Participants'  Perspectives"  report  on PROSCOL  was not
what it did,  but  what  it did  not do;  casual  interviews  can help  in understanding  how  a program  works
on the ground,  but on their  own  they  cannot  deliver  a credible  assessment  of impact.
However,  Speedy  has also  leant  that  rigorous  impact  evaluation  is much  more  difficult  than
she first  thought,  and one can sometimes  obtain  a worryingly  wide  range  of estimates,  depending  on
the specifics  of the  methodology  used.  Chisquare's  advice  remains  valuable  in suggesting  alternative
methods  in the frequent  situations  of less  than  ideal  data,  and  pointing  out  the pitfalls. Speedy  has
also learnt  to be eclectic  about  data.
The Finance  Minister  did  eventually  convince  the Minister  of Social  Development  to
randomize  the first  tranche  allocation  of PROSCOL  II across  school  board  areas  in the rest  of Labas,
and  this helped  Speedy  identify  the program's  impact. Her  analysis  of the new  question  on child
labor  added  to the LBS  survey  revealed  that  there  was some  foregone  income  from  PROSCOL,
though  not  quite  as much  as she had  first  thought.
Tangential  Economiste  made  a further  comment  on Speedy's  first  report  on PROSCOL,  to
the effect  that  Speedy  could  also  measure  the future  income  gains  from  PROSCOL,  using  recent
36work by labor economists on the returns to schooling  in Labas. When Speedy  factored this into her
calculations,  PROSCOL  was found to have quite a reasonable economic  rate of return, on top of the
fact that the benefits were reaching the poor.
One big difference  from her first PROSCOL  evaluation is that Speedy  now spends a lot more
time understanding  how each program  works before doing any number  crunching. And she spreads
the evaluation  over a much longer  period, often including baseline and multiple  follow-up surveys of
the same households.
However,  everything has not gone smoothly.  At first she had a lot of trouble getting the
relevant line ministries to cooperate  with her. It is often hard to get them to define the objectives of
each program she is evaluating; Speedy  sometimes  thinks that getting the relevant line ministry to
define the objectives  of its public spending  is an important  contribution  in its own right. But
eventually  the line Ministries realize  that they can learn a lot from these evaluations,  and that they
were being  taken seriously by the Finance  Minister.
Internal politics within the government  is often a problem. Thankfully  the data side is now
working well. The Minister had the good idea of making the Secretary of Statistics an Advisor to the
unit, and Mr. Statistica is his representative. Speedy often commissions  new surveys from LSB and
advises them on questionnaire design  and sampling.
Speedy has also started giving  advice to other countries and international  agencies (including
the World  Bank) embarking on impact  evaluations  of social programs. And she has found that
swapping  notes with other program  analysts  can be valuable. For example,  I learnt about Speedy's
interesting  experience  with PROSCOL  on a recent mission to Labas,  and I also told here about recent
work evaluating  a World Bank supported  anti-poverty  program in Argentina (Jalan and Ravallion,
1999; Note 8 summarizes  the methods  and results of that study). Speedy reckons there are policy
mysteries  galore in Labas and elsewhere  - mysteries that the tools she has learnt to use might well
throw light on.
37Note 8: An example  for another  anti-poverty program
With support  from the World  Bank,  Argentina  introduced  the Trabajar  Program  in 1997,  in response
to a sharp  increase  in unemployment,  and evidence  that  this was  especially  hurting  the poor. The
program  aimed  to provide  useful  work  on community  projects  in poor areas  work  for unemployed
workers  from poor families.  Jalan  and Ravallion  (1999)  assessed  the income  gains to the families  of
participating  workers  and examined  how  well targeted  the  gains were. A survey  was done of a
random  sample  of participating  families,  at the same  time, and using  the same survey  instrument  and
interviewers,  as a pre-planned  large  national  sample  survey. A logit model of program  participation
was first estimated  on the pooled  sample  and the propensity  scores  were then  calculated.  The
matching  methods  described  in Note 3 were then used  to draw  a control  group  from the larger  cross-
sectional  survey.  The participants  sample  had a mean  propensity  score of 0.40, while  it was 0.075  for
the national  sample.  So the national  sample is clearly  unrepresentative  of Trabajar  participants.  After
matching,  however,  the comparison  group drawn  from  the national  sample  also had a score  of 0.40.
The results indicated  that income  gains  were about  half of the gross wage on the program  (the
difference  being  due to lost income  from work  that had to be given  up to join the program). About
80% of the families  of participating  workers  came  from the poorest  20% of all families  in Argentina,
in terms of (pre-intervention)  income  per person. A test for selection  bias in the resulting  matching
estimator  was also done  using instrumental  variables. The  bias in the matching  estimates  was
negligible.
38References (including Professor Chisquare's Reading List for Speedy)
Atkinson, Anthony, 1987,  "On the Measurement  of Poverty",  Econometrica,  55: 749-64.
Blundell, Richard  W. and R.J. Smith, 1993,  "Simultaneous  Microeconometric  Models with
Censoring or Qualitative Dependent  Variables",  in G.S. Maddala, C.R. Rao and H.D. Vinod
(eds) Handbook  of Statistics Volume  11 Amsterdam:  North Holland.
Foster, James, J. Greer, and Erik Thorbecke, 1984,  "A Class of Decomposable  Poverty Measures",
Econometrica,  52: 761-765.
Grossman,  Jean Baldwin, 1994, "Evaluating  Social Policies: Principles  and U.S. Experience", World
Bank Research Observer,  9(2): 159-80.
Heckman, James, 1997, "Instrumental  Variables.  A Study  of Implicit Behavioral  Assumptions  Used
in Making Program  Evaluations",  Journal ofHuman Resources, 32(3): 441-461.
Heckman, James and Richard Robb, 1985, "Alternative  Methods  of Evaluating the Impact of
Interventions:  An Overview",  Journal of Econometrics,  30: 239-67.
Heckman, J., H. Ichimura, J. Smith, and P. Todd, 1998,  "Characterizing  Selection  Bias using
Experimental  Data", Econometrica,  66: 1017-1099.
Jalan, Jyotsna and Martin Ravallion, 1999, "Income Gains from Workfare and their Distribution",
Policy Research  Working  Paper, World Bank, Washington  DC.
Meyer, Bruce D., 1995,  "Natural and Quasi-Experiments  in Economics",  Journal of Business and
Economic Statistics, April.
Manski, Charles and Irwin Garfinkel (eds), 1992,  Evaluating  Welfare  and Training  Programs,
Cambridge,  Mass: Harvard University  Press.
Manski, Charles and Steven Lerman, 1977,  "The Estimation  of Choice Probabilities  from
Choice-Based  Samples",  Econometrica,  45: 1977-88.
39Moffitt, Robert, 1991, "Program Evaluation  with Nonexperimental  Data", Evaluation  Review, 15(3):
291-3  14.
Ravallion,  Martin, 1994, Poverty Comparisons,  Fundamentals  in Pure and Applied Economics
Volume  56, Harwood Academic  Publishers.
Rivers, Douglas  and Quang H. Vuong, 1988,  "Limited Information  Estimators  and Exogeneity
Tests for Simultaneous Probit  Models", Journal of Econometrics,  39: 347-366.
Rosenbaum,  P. and D. Rubin, 1983,  "The Central Role of the Propensity  Score in Observational
Studies for Causal Effects", Biometrika,  70: 41-55.
Rosenbaum,  P. and D. Rubin, 1985,  "Constructing  a Control Group  using Multivariate Matched
Sampling  Methods that Incorporate  the Propensity Score,"  American  Statistician, 39: 35-39.
40Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2136  An Empirical  Analysis  of Competition, Scott J. Wallsten  June 1999  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Privatization,  and Regulation  in  38526
Telecommunications  Markets  in
Africa  and Latin  America
WPS2137  Globalization  and  National  Andres  Solimano  June 1999  D. Cortijo
Development  at the End  of the  84005
20"'  Century:  Tensions  and  Challenges
WPS2138  Multilateral  Disciplines  for  Bernard  Hoekman  June  1999  L.  Tabada
Investment-Related  Policies  Kamal  Saggi  36896
WPS2139  Small  States,  Small  Problems?  William  Easterly  June  1999  K. Labrie
Aart Kraay  31001
WPS2140  Gender  Bias  in China,  the Republic  Monica  Das  Gupta  June 1999  M. Das  Gupta
Of Korea,  and India  1920-90:  Li Shuzhuo  31983
Effects  of War, Famine,  and
Fertility  Decline
WPS2141 Capital  Flows,  Macroeconomic  Oya  Celasun  July 1999  L. Nathaniel
Management,  and  the Financial  Cevdet  Denizer  89569
System:  Turkey,  1989-97  Dong  He
WPS2142 Adjusting  to Trade  Policy  Reform  Steven  J. Matusz  July 1999  L.  Tabada
David  Tarr  36896
WPS2143 Bank-Based  and Market-Based  Asli Demirguc-Kunt  July 1999  K. Labrie
Financial  Systems:  Cross-Country  Ross Levine  31001
Comparisons
WPS2144  Aid Dependence  Reconsidered  Jean-Paul  Azam  July 1999  H. Sladovich
Shantayanan  Devarajan  37698
Stephen  A. O'Connell
WPS2145  Assessing  the Impact  of Micro-credit Hassan  Zaman  July 1999  B. Mekuria
on  Poverty  and Vulnerability  in  82756
Bangladesh
WPS2146  A New  Database  on Financial  Thorsten  Beck  July 1999  K. Labrie
Development  and Structure  Asll  Demirguc,-Kunt  31001
Ross  Levine
WPS2147 Developing  Country  Goals  and  Constantine  Michalopoulos  July 1999  L.  Tabada
Strategies  for the Millennium  Round  36896
WPS2148 Social  Capital,  Household  Welfare,  Christiaan  Grootaert  July 1999  G. Ochieng
And Poverty  in Indonesia  31123Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2149 Income  Gains  to the Poor  from  Jyotsna  Jalan  July 1999  P. Sader
Workfare:  Estimates  for Argentina's  Martin  Ravallion  33902
Trabajar  Program
WPS2150  Who  Wants  to Redistribute?  Russia's Martin  Ravallion  July 1999  P.  Sader
Tunnel  Effect  in the 1990s  Michael  Lokshin  33902
WPS2151  A Few  Things  Transport  Regulators  Ian  Alexander  July 1999  G. Chenet-Smith
Should  Know  about  Risk  and  the Cost Antonio Estache  36370
Of Capital  Adele  Oliveri
WPS2152 Comparing  the Performance  of Public Antonio  Estache  July 1999  G. Chenet-Smith
and  Private  Water  Companies  in the  Martin  A. Rossi  36370
Asia and  Pacific  Region:  What  a
Stochastic  Costs Frontier  Shows